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Approaches to Accountability in City of Toronto Long-Term Care Homes 
Chairperson of the supervisory committee: Professor Brenda Gamble 
Faculty of Health Sciences 
Within the context of healthcare accountability are concepts such as quality and 
safety of care, resource allocation and the notion of value for money. When 
understanding accountability, questions such as who is accountable for what and how is 
accountability demonstrated arise. As the number of stakeholders and funders increase, 
and in a highly regulated long-term care sector, the answers to these questions increase in 
complexity. The goal of this study is to examine the approaches to accountability within 
ten homes that are publicly funded and publicly delivered by the City of Toronto, within 
a framework of accountability mechanisms including financial oversight, regulations and 
information, and professionalism. A case study research design, with both document 
review and semi-structured interviews, was utilized to understand the implications of key 
variables on the framework to evaluate accountability. The results are based on seven 
informants from publicly funded and delivered homes in the province of Ontario both 
from senior management and long-term care home administrators. The dominant 
mechanisms of accountability found in this research are financial oversight, regulations, 
and information, while professionalism played a marginal role. Key informants identified 
the challenges of being accountable to multiple funders, including five LHINs and to the 
City of Toronto. The increased need to be compliant with legislation requirements, LHIN 
performance indicators, and ensure high-quality resident care is not consistent with the 
iv 
 
finite and decreasing resources required to successfully demonstrate accountability to 
multiple stakeholders.  
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Glossary of Terms 
Approved Beds 
The number of beds that a facility has been approved to operate by the ministry. 
These cannot be sold to another licensee and are different than licensed beds due to the 
nature or location of the beds. 
Community Care Access Centres (CCACs) 
Community Care Access Centres (CCACs) are organizations established by 
MOHLTC that provide services to the community including admission into LTC homes. 
They have Case Managers/Placement Coordinators who authorize admissions into LTC 
homes for both short stay, convalescent care, and long stay admissions.  
Home Administrator 
The Administrator has overall responsibility for the day-to-day operations of a home. 
Home Type  
There are various types of operators of LTC homes: charitable organizations, 
municipalities, corporations, partnerships, and sole proprietors. The Ministry of Health 
and Long-Term Care funds LTC homes to provide care and services to their residents. 
Long-term care homes may be either for-profit or non-profit. Charitable and municipal 
homes are non-profit. Some hospitals in northern communities may also operate LTC 
beds under the Elderly Capital Assistance program. 
Licensee 
Is the holder of a licence issued by the Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, and 
includes an individual or corporation, the municipality or municipalities, or board of 
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management that maintains a municipal home, joint home, or First Nations home 
approved by the ministry. 
Licensed Beds 
Beds that have been licensed by the ministry to an LTC home to a licensee (includes 
an individual or corporation, the municipality or municipalities or board of management) 
and can be sold to another licensee. 
Nursing Home 
The term nursing home was historically used as a term for a home that provided care 
to elderly residents. More recently, the term long-term care home has been adopted by the 











Section 1 Introduction 
Overview of Thesis 
The thesis format is based on the criteria of a published article as part of the 
fulfillment of the master’s degree. The article was published in 2014, titled 
Accountability in the City of Toronto's 10 Long-Term Care Homes. This article was 
published in the peer-reviewed journal of Healthcare Policy, volume 10, special edition 
and has been used with permission of the publisher as part of this thesis. The thesis is 
divided into six sections: 
 Section 1: An introduction that outlines the context of the researcher within the 
broader-funded study and an overview of the research questions. 
 Section 2: A literature review, with emphasis on: 
- Healthcare model, long-term care sector 
- Theoretical framework 
- Policy instruments 
- Independent variables 
 Section 3: A discussion section that further details the methodology and research design 
and study limitations. It will further expand on the findings presented in the published 
article in Section 4, as well as some additional considerations and how they connect to 
the theoretical framework.  
 Section 4: The manuscript for the completed study in the format for submission to 
Healthcare Policy. The article is titled Accountability in the .City of Toronto's 10 Long-





 Section 5: Summary of the thesis that includes a conclusion, recommendations, and 
areas for future research. 
 Section 6:  Appendices which includes informed consent forms and related 
questionnaires. 
Overview of Accountability  
The first known use of the word accountability dates to 1770, while the concept of 
accountability, known as the act of being accountable to someone for something, dates to 
the 14
th
 century (Business Dictionary, 2017). The transition from personal accountability, 
responsibility for one’s own actions, to organizational accountability is a more difficult 
concept to define. When organizations are required to show that they are accountable, 
questions arise as to who are these organizations’ accountable to, for what and how do 
they demonstrate accountability (Deber, 2014). 
Currently, Canada faces significant aging of its population as the proportion of 
seniors increases more rapidly than all other age groups (Government of Canada, 2012). 
In 2001, one-in-eight Canadians was aged 65 years or over; by 2026, one-in-five 
Canadians will have reached age 65 (see Figure 1). The necessary supports needed for 
this aging population will require efforts in improving health; strengthening supportive 
environments within communities; and sustainability of government programs, such as 







Figure 1. Canadian Senior Population Project (Stats Can, 2016). 
The complexity of accountability continues to increase when multiple stakeholders 
are involved in a complex funding model. Ontario’s LTC homes can be categorized into 
three sub-sectors, based on their ownership structure: private not-for-profit (e.g., religious 
or lay groups), private for-profit (e.g., individual, private organizations or corporations) 
and public (e.g., municipal homes) (Berta et al., 2006). This research specifically 
addresses the publicly funded, publicly delivered long-term care homes (LTCHs) in the 
City of Toronto. 
The literature indicates that while there has been research on the subject of 
accountability (Fooks & Maslove, 2004; Abelson & Gauvin, 2004; Minkler, 2004), the 
majority of this work has not been focused on healthcare and especially not on long-term 
care homes. There are many stakeholders involved in the delivery, regulation, and 
funding of long-term care homes in Ontario. A layer of complexity is added within the 
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accountability. This thesis will examine the role of accountability and address the 
research questions; (1) What are the approaches to accountability used in LTCHs? and 
(2) to whom and for what are homes accountable? 
This thesis is part of a larger project funded by the Canadian Institute for Health 
Research (CIHR).  The project was Partnership for Health System Improvement on 
Approaches to Accountability.  Within the project, an analytical framework was created 
and developed to include policy instruments of financial incentives, regulations, 
information and reliance on professionalism and stewardship. There are various 
accountability structures that may be competing, crossing many stakeholders and 
utilizing many different instruments such as regulations, quality of care and financial 
incentives. Research in this area is essential to understand how accountability is defined 
and managed, who is responsible for accountability and whether there are any unintended 
consequences to these multiple layers of accountability. The purpose of the larger study 
was to determine if in fact there were multiple ways to achieve accountability across the 
healthcare continuum and whether there were any similarities or differences in these 
approaches. By utilizing a standard framework it would allow for these comparisons. In 
addition, this research could help to begin and inform the conversation about best 
practices in accountability. 
Research Questions 
This thesis is part of the research completed for the larger study of Partnership for 
Health System Improvement (PHSI) funded by the Canadian Institute for Health 
Research (CIHR).).  The purpose of this study was to use a standard framework to 





the healthcare system. Eleven sectors were included in this study, such as hospitals, 
community care access centres, long-term care facilities, the Ministry of Health & Long-
Term Care, medical laboratories, etc. (Deber, 2014). The research presented in this thesis 
is a contributing section within the long-term care sector published in the special edition 
of Healthcare Policy (2014). 
This research project included collaborative participation with a larger provincial 
study, including representatives from key stakeholder groups, other researchers, and 
research assistants; establishment of the partnerships with key stakeholders; development 
of the research questions and research design; collection of data; data entry; data analysis; 
and the authoring of a published paper. 
As one of the larger sectors in the continuum of care within the funded project, long-
term care was broken into two separate studies: for-profit delivery homes and publically 
delivered homes. The focus of this thesis is the City of Toronto homes, as they are the 
largest group of LTCHs that includes both those that are publicly funded and those that 
are publicly delivered. Another study was completed on those homes that are publicly 
funded but have a private, for-profit delivery system (Berta, Laporte & Wodchis, 2014). 
The City of Toronto currently operates 10 LTCHs that fall within five different 
LHINs, some of which also encompass areas outside city boundaries. The responsibility 
for both the operation and management of these 10 homes resides with the City of 
Toronto’s Long-Term Care Homes and Services Division (‘the Division’) (City of 
Toronto, 2016). 





1. Identify and describe the current accountability structures used within long-term 
care homes;  
2. Determine the relationships between structures and organizations and identify the 
advantages and disadvantages of these; and  
3. Examine the contractual agreements and compensation used to formally or 






Section 2 Literature Review 
Overview 
This study used multiple sources of information including scholarly, peer reviewed 
literature, as well as grey literature. Grey literature is defined as documents that are not 
controlled by commercial publishers, or peer review process.  This can include 
documents produced for academics, government, or business, and are of sufficient quality 
to be collected and preserved (University of New Mexico Health Sciences Library and 
Informatics Center, 2018). The grey literature that was used in this thesis includes 
accountability agreements, manuals, and legislation relating to the long-term care sector. 
Document review can be useful in studies where data beneficial to the study has already 
been collected and access to a data set may be more extensive than what they would have 
independently been able to collect (World Bank Institute Evaluation Group, 2007). The 
literature review was to identify research and articles related to accountability in the 
healthcare as well as long-term care sector.  
There were three strategies in the literature search. The first strategy was to review 
the sources identified in the larger CIHR study that have been previously utilized. The 
second strategy was to use information the researcher was aware of due to previous 
experience in the long-term care field. The third strategy was using search engines such 
as Pub Med, Ovid, Medline, and Google Scholar. This search strategy looked at key 
words such as accountability, regulations, funding, long-term care, nursing homes, and 
performance standards, alone and in combination. The abstracts were reviewed and 





The data collection of documents was completed using electronic index searching and 
articles maintained in an electronic database. The documents were saved on the 
researcher’s computer and identified by a reference system that identified the key areas to 
support the research questions and theoretical framework of the study. The majority of 
the literature utilized was from 2006 to the present, with the exception of a number of 
historical articles that provided context and supported the theoretical framework. The 
year 2006 has significance as this was the year LHISA, or the Local Health Integration 
System Act, was created. This legislation created the local healthcare integration 
networks, or the LHINs, in Ontario. This is noteworthy as this changed the funding 
source and accountability body for various healthcare sectors in Ontario, such as 
hospitals, community services, and long-term care homes. 
  All documents were available via PDF format and readily obtainable. All articles 
were in the English language as this was the native tongue of the researcher. Articles 
from Canada, England, New Zealand, Australia, and USA were mostly chosen because 
these countries have a publicly funded healthcare system or had similar economic status 
as Canada, thus making it easier to make comparisons (Deber, 2010; Marchildon, 2013).  
 The grey literature search completed was mostly due to the researcher’s previous 
knowledge of the long-term care home sector and searching various websites. The grey 
literature or unpublished articles are important as they provide contextual information 
that may not otherwise be published. There are few scholarly articles on approaches to 
accountability within the healthcare sectors, and even fewer written for long-term care 
homes, making the grey literature instrumental in this research. Grey literature and 





literature provided context within the field of long-term care, relationships (both formal 
and informal), and also highlighted processes and requirements.  
 Data collected from documents for analysis included both written documentation 
and documentation provided by Toronto Long-Term Care Homes and Services Division. 
The documentation retrieved from websites includes 
● Legislation & regulations (e.g., LHISA 2007, Long-Term Care Home Act);  
● Historical documents and reports from organizations (e.g., strategic directions, 
report cards, efficiency review, annual reports), and associations (e.g., 
OLTCA); and 
● Long-Term Care Home Service Accountability Agreements (L-SAA) and 
supporting documentation (e.g., Long-Term Care Home Accountability 
Planning Submission, Target Definitions). 
Each document was reviewed and analyzed for its contributions in informing the 
research questions for this study. The literature review was to identify research and 
articles related to accountability in the healthcare as well as long-term care sector.  
Overview of Healthcare Model 
Accountability has been a key driver for influencing change in healthcare both in a 
Canadian and an international context (Canadian Healthcare Association, 2001; Leo and 
Canadian Healthcare Association, 2006; Marchildon, 2013). But what does this mean? 
Literature supports ideas around accountability in other sectors, but little research has 
been completed for the healthcare sector, even though this has been identified as a 
priority by governments, health service providers, and users of the healthcare system 





The literature defines accountability in many different ways. In essence, 
accountability is the notion of having to be answerable to someone for meeting defined 
objectives (Emanuel and Emanuel 1996). The literature indicates that accountability has 
financial, performance, and political/democratic implications, (Binkerhoff, 2004) and can 
be ex ante or ex post (Klein, 1993). Within healthcare, this may translate into fiscal 
accountability to payers, clinical accountability for quality of care, (Binkerhoff, 2004) 
and accountability to the public. Those who participate in accountability may include 
various combinations of providers, patients, payers, and regulators who may have formal 
or informal relationships (Fooks & Maslove, 2004; Binkerhoff, 2004; Klein, 1993).  
In Ontario, long-term care homes are regulated, inspected and have accommodation 
fees set by the Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care (MOHLTC). To ensure that long-
term care homes provide “residents safe, consistent, high-quality, and resident-centred 
care”, there are provincial standards defined in the Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007, 
and Ontario Regulation 79/10 (“Find a long-term care home”, 2016, p.1). Long-term care 
provides more support than what can be provided through home and community care, and 
is less expensive than care provided at an acute hospital level (“This is Long-Term Care”, 
2015).  
Residents of Ontario with valid Ontario healthcare insurance (OHIP) who require 24-
hour nursing or personal care and need assistance with all or some activities of daily 
living are eligible for this residential service. The cost for a resident is standardized based 
on the type of accommodation requested (basic, semi-private or private room). There is 
an opportunity to have a rate reduction from the standard cost if a person can demonstrate 





housekeeping, social, spiritual, and recreational programs, bed linens and laundry service, 
and access to medical services and health professionals. Services for additional fees are 
available and vary depending on the home; such as hair dressing, cable, telephone, 
massage therapy, etc. (“Find a long-term care home”, 2016).   
There are 625 licensed homes in Ontario and 77,541 beds available for seniors (“This 
is Long-Term Care”, 2016). LTCHs also provide other services such as convalescent care 
beds, which provide short-term care to support the transition between a hospitalization 
and a patient’s home. LTCHs also provide respite beds, which support residents for a 
period of time to allow caregivers and families respite from providing many hours of care 
for their loved one. The Convalescent Care and Short Stay-Respite programs make up 
only 1% of all beds available in the province (“Find a long-term care home”, 2016). 
A unique feature in the LTC sector is the mix of private for-profit homes and not-for-
profit homes. As of June 2017, 58% of LTCHs are for-profit, with a mix of sole 
proprietors and board oversight among publicly traded corporations such as Extendicare, 
Chartwell Master Care Inc., and Revera Long-Term Care Inc. Another 23% are not-for-
profit homes with varying governance structures, principally charities (e.g., The Central 
Canadian District of The Christian And Missionary Alliance in Canada). The remaining 
16% were municipally owned homes (e.g., City of Toronto) and 2% were classified as 
Other, such as hospitals in northern communities operating under the Elderly Capital 
Assistance program (ELDCAP) (“This is Long-Term Care”, 2016). 
Beds in a LTCH are either licensed beds or approved beds. This means that the 





Ontario. Any modifications (change in bed type, change of ownership) to a bed require 
multiple levels of approval (“This is Long-Term Care”, 2015). 
Overview of Accountability 
The accountability phenomenon is a concept that is not easily defined and is very 
fluid, dependant on the situation, stakeholders and desired outcomes (Mulgan, 2000). To 
study accountability, a focus on distinction, clarity, and which approaches are most 
successful is required. Accountability has been defined multiple ways (Mulgan 2000); 
most simply, it means being answerable to someone for meeting defined objectives 
(Emanuel and Emanuel 1996).   
Accountability in healthcare is considered one of the major issues in the sector 
(Emanuel & Emanuel,1996) and is a key element of many current healthcare reform 
efforts, both in Canada and internationally (Canadian Healthcare Association, 2001; Leo 
and Canadian Healthcare Association, 2006; Ontario Health Coalition, 2012; Marchildon, 
2013). The Ministry of Health defines accountability as meeting performance or planning 
obligations (MOHLTC, 2017). As Brown et al., have identified, “strengthening 
accountability is central to the recommendations made in all recent studies on the future 
of healthcare” (2006, p.72.) Yet there is insufficient research about the best practices and 
a perception that “poorly applied approaches may have unintended negative 
consequences and severe effects on the health system” (Deber, 2014, p.12). It has been 
stated “no single model of accountability is appropriate to healthcare,” (Emanuel & 
Emanuel, 1996, p.229), and there is no one-size-fits-all model (Deber, 2014, Marchildon, 





Accountability in healthcare is stressed by all levels of government and the public 
with respect to the health outputs produced (e.g., patient outcomes, decreased wait times, 
cost containment, and quality of care) and from the inputs used (public funds derived 
from tax revenue, medical services). For accountability to be demonstrated, it requires 
that all parties know their roles, responsibilities, and performance expectations. Currently 
some avenues of accountability exist from a governance perspective, such as professional 
accreditation and monitoring by an appropriate professional association. Another method 
is the establishment of provincial performance targets that health regions are responsible 
to meet and are monitored by a public body (the government) (Fooks, Maslove, & 
Rhetoric, 2004.). This information is disseminated through annual reports produced by 
health regions to the governing body and the general public, albeit not in a timely 
manner.  
To evaluate the effectiveness of accountability and the impact that is has on the 
healthcare sector, a standard framework is required. This includes not only the policy that 
informs accountability, but in a practical sense of how to achieve and demonstrate 
accountability. Clarification and understanding around the best way to achieve 
accountability has been identified as a priority by governments, providers, and recipients 
of healthcare services, both in Canada and internationally (Deber, 2014). The lack of 
research in this area suggests that demonstrating accountability may have unintended 
consequences, and the long-term care home sector is no different from other healthcare 
sectors. In other words, this supports the need for future research into accountability and 





In 2010, further legislation supported increased accountability with the Excellent 
Care for All Act (ECFAA, 2010). This Act outlines the steps the Ontario Government 
will make to reform healthcare, “[by putting] Ontario patients first by strengthening the 
healthcare sector's organizational focus and accountability to deliver high quality patient 
care.” (“Excellent Care for All,” 2016). This additional legislation requires that health 
service providers have a legislative requirement to provide and demonstrate quality 
service to the users of the healthcare system. 
In 2006, the Ontario government implemented the regionalization of healthcare 
services with the introduction of 14 Local Health Integration Networks (LHINs). Each 
LHIN is responsible for the planning, integration, and funding of health services in its 
region, including hospitals, community care providers, and long-term care homes 
(“Ontario LHINS”, 2014). As part of this legislation, accountability agreements were put 
in place to support the funding structure from the Ministry to LHINs and, cascading 
down, from LHIN to health service providers (“Ontario LHINS”, 2014). This structure 
supports publicly funded hospitals and long-term care homes. 
The Long-Term Care Home Service Accountability Agreement (L-SAA) is a legal 
agreement between the LTCH and the LHIN, required under the Local Health System 
Integration Act (LHSIA, 2006). The initial L-SAA was executed April 1, 2010, with a 
term of three years. The second L-SAA was executed April 1, 2013 until March 31, 2016. 
The current agreement from April 1, 2016 is set to expire March 31, 2019. The body of 
the agreement is a standard contract common to all LHINs and agreed to by MOHLTC, 
LHIN Legal Counsel, LTCH Legal Counsel(s), and an L-SAA Steering Committee and 





LTCHs. Within the current Long-Term Care Accountability agreement, the initial 
verbiage outlines: 
 “The service accountability agreement supports a collaborative relationship between 
the LHIN and the HSP [long-term care home]: to improve the health of Ontarians through 
better access to high quality health services; to co-ordinate health care in local health 
systems, by such actions as supporting the implementation of Health Links to facilitate 
regional integrated health care service delivery; to manage the health care system at the 
local level effectively and efficiently; and, to create a health care system that is person-
centered, accountable, transparent, and evidence-based ” (L-SAA, 2016). Schedules 
within the agreement serve as appendices that enable customization for individual LHINS 
and LTCHs. (LAPS Guidelines, 2016).  
Although highly relevant to the research questions, much literature has existed within 
silos, and has not necessarily been applied to issues of accountability and 
governance/ownership within healthcare. This framework is a common platform created 
by Raisa Deber (2014), to understand the accountability phenomenon in healthcare and 
allows for a fluid approach for analysis to address the strengths and weakness of 
accountability and the effect on performance and/or policy development. 
Theoretical Framework  
This framework by which this thesis evaluates accountability in publicly funded, 
publicly delivered long-term care homes is a pre-existing framework designed by the 
research of a larger study of the Partnership for Health System Improvement (PHSI), 
funded by the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR), on approaches to 





as political accountability, economic accountability, or professional accountability, as 
described by Emanuel and Emanuel (1996), but rather focuses on dimensions of 
accountability. These dimensions allow for a fluid approach for analysis to address the 
strengths and weaknesses of accountability and the effect on performance and/or policy 
development. Much theoretical literature, which, although highly relevant to the research 
questions, have existed within silos, and have not necessarily been applied to issues of 
accountability and governance/ownership within healthcare (Howlett &Ramesh, 2003; 
Brinkerhoff, 2004; Doern & Phidd, 1992; Eliadis, 2007). Deber, the principle investigator 
with the ground-breaking research, describes this approach as “…several literatures that 
have not previously, to our knowledge, been used to analyze… various approaches to 
accountability” (2014, p.13)   
This framework (see Figure 2) draws from the political science concept of “policy 
instruments” or “governing instruments” (Deber, 2014). There are four policy 
instruments that will be utilized in the evaluation of accountability: regulations, financial 
incentives, information directed towards patients/payers, and 
professionalism/stewardship. Within this framework, there were three independent 
variables examined that were identified based on the research questions. While this is a 
qualitative study, standard quantitative terminology (such as variable) has been used to 
identify key concepts and is consistent with previously published articles. The 
independent variables examined were chosen based on broader research questions. These 
variables directly or indirectly influence the approaches to accountability and highlight 





The central hypothesis of this thesis is that these four approaches/instruments will 
have varying outcomes based on the three variables;  
(1) policy goals being pursued, framed as a question of,  “What are you accountable 
for?”;  
(2) the governance/ownership relationships, framed as a question of “Who is 
accountable to whom?”; and  
(3) the types and characteristics of services being delivered, framed as a question, 
“How are you demonstrating accountability and what are the impacts?”  
 
 
Figure 2. Theoretical Framework. 
Policy Instruments 
The research goal for this thesis is to identify which of these policy instruments, or 
approaches to accountability, have been used within the long-term care home sector that 
is publicly funded and publicly delivered. The policy instruments may be classified in 
many ways. Doern and Phidd (1992) used a scale based on their level of intrusiveness or 





makers may choose not to act or respond at all. The next step includes symbolic 
responses, education, or information to encourage people to act in a particular way. 
Doern and Phidd (1992) term this approach "exhortation." Very simply, this would relate 
to the concept of a “gold star” for a favorable behaviour/outcome. The next step on the 
scale is slightly more invasive, where decision-makers may choose to intervene indirectly 
by using incentives. This could range from voluntary compliance without threats or may 
include something more formal as ‘expenditures’ and/or ‘taxation’ policies. Still more 
intrusive are directives or ‘regulations’. This can be seen in many different formats, but 
the main goal is ‘Thou shalt act/do/behave’ as per the objectives set forth. This level of 
instrumentation often shifts the compliance costs from regulators to those being regulated 
(Deber, 2014). The literature also looks at ways of enforcing these steps, from 
information to licensure/accreditation, payment, and legal sanctions. This has been linked 
to literature on the new public management (Hood, 2000) and identifies interactions 
between public and private forces, as well as the implications of the type of policy 
network for selection of policy instrument (Bressers & O'Toole, 1998). Although these 
concepts have been applied to the field of environmental regulation, (Jordan et al., 2005; 
Zito et al., 2003) and in a limited way to healthcare (e.g., the governance of primary care 
in Switzerland (Braun & Etienne, 2004) and social services, such as child health policy in 
Australia (Leggat, 2004)) there has yet to be research conducted on applying this 
methodology to accountability in long-term care homes. 
Based on the literature from Hood (2000), who identifies the difference in the public 
and private dynamics, additional and supplemental research by Berta, Laporte and 





and services (2014). This suggests that there is a difference in the impact of 
accountability and what this means for those companies that are publically funded versus 
privately funded. The four policy instruments/approaches have been selected as they are 
currently being utilized in the health sector in Canada and internationally (Deber, 2014). 
The hypothesis is that these four approaches will have varying outcomes based on the 
three variables as outlined in the previous section. 
 






Information directed towards patients/payers. 
One variation of the exhortation governing instrument is information, which may 
work both directly and indirectly by directing potential “end users” (residents, 
public/private payers) within a context of allowing market forces to work more 
effectively by encouraging rational choice of the ‘best’ care (Howells, 2005; Morris & 
Zelmer, 2005). An example of the use of this approach is the ongoing performance 
measurement and improvement of an organization that is shared or supplied to the end 
user (Barnsley et al., 2005; Hurst & Jee-Hughes, 2001; Shaw, 2003; Smith, 2002; 
Veillard et al., 2005). Issues in using this approach include who establishes these 
measures and which parties enforce them (Baker et al., 2004). This thesis will look at 
performance management and public reporting, both quality/adverse event indicators, and 
compliance inspection reports.  
Professionalism and stewardship. 
The other instrument that is a variant on the exhortation governing instrument directs 
information to providers rather than to payers or residents and their family (Lemieux-
Charles & Champagne, 2004). It relies on high trust and the expectation that providers, as 
a group, have intentions to do the right thing but may need support in clarifying best 
practices as well as exposing poor practice. Documents such as best practices or clinical 
guidelines that inform evidence-based practice often fall within this category if 
compliance is voluntary. Depending on the indicator and how the information is 
disseminated, performance reports or scorecards may also fall into this type of approach. 
It is important to note that this approach is often supported by other regulatory 





guidelines for Registered Nurses and Registered Practical Nurses that is supported 
through their regulatory bodies (RNAO, RPNAO). The challenge with this instrument in 
long-term care is that almost three-quarters of the work force in long-term care are 
personal support workers (PSWs) who are unregulated healthcare professionals. PSWs 
perform the majority of the services and are not regulated by a governing body. 
Financial incentives. 
This instrument, also known as an expenditure governing instrument, alters payments 
to entice providers to behave in a certain manner (Donaldson et al., 2005; Evans, 1984; 
Robinson, 2001). One example of this concept which has been reviewed in detail is the 
conception of pay for performance which has occurred in the UK, US, Australia and 
Canada (Epstein, 2007; Pink et al., 2006; Doran et al., 2006; Donaldson et al., 2005). An 
Ontario example of this is the Pay for Results Program that is used to incentivise 
hospitals to improve emergency department performance. The premise is based on a 
ranking system, where the better the hospital performs relative to their peers, the more 
funding they receive. This is also being used an incentive in the hospital service 
accountability agreement and has been identified in Ontario’s funding formulas for 
specialized wait times funding and quality-based procedure methodology (Sutherland, 
2011; Sutherland et al., 2011).  
Regulations. 
This governing instrument that employs the regulation concept also plays a major role 
in healthcare (Walshe, 2003). This requires providers to act or behave in a certain way, or 
not. These regulations can be supported by agreements or legislation; they may also rely 





Registered Nursing Association of Ontario (RNAO). The literature notes the ongoing 
challenges of balancing market forces and regulation (Chinitz et al., 1998; Saltman et al., 
2002). As 72.6% of the workforce in long-term care is personal support workers (PSWs) 
and are, to date, are currently unregulated healthcare professionals. PSWs are therefore 
not registered or licensed to a regulatory body or college (“This is Long-Term care,” 
2016, Baumann et al., 2014), outlining the challenges with using regulations to support 
accountability. 
Blended approach. 
There is also the opportunity to use a blended model of policy instruments. This is 
apparent when there are additional policy instruments used for reinforcement. An 
example of this is using a combination of information both designed to be communicated 
to the consumers as well as to the providers. A publicly reported balanced scorecard that 
includes best practice indicators, financial performance as identified in a service 
accountability agreement, and quality indicators is an example of a blended approach. 
The enforcement of desired policy instruments at the strongest level is backed by 
government legislation. An example is Norway, which has a ‘Patient’s Bills of Rights’ as 
a part of its formal appeal mechanism for patients. A relevant example that will be 
described throughout this thesis is the enforcement of the Long-Term Care Home Act 
(LTCHA). An example of government policy aimed at enforcing a piece of legislation 
may include various combinations of exhortation (e.g., efforts to evaluate and improve 
the quality of information, public reporting), expenditure (e.g., financial penalties, service 
accountability agreement), and regulation (e.g., audits, compliance process, accreditation, 






The second component to the framework for this thesis focuses on three variables:   
● Policy goals that are being pursued, such as access, quality, effectiveness, 
satisfaction;  
● Governance/ownership structure, importantly, the variation between public 
and privately funded structures;  
● Goods/services that are being delivered, which can affect the success of the 
various accountability approaches. 
This framework was also designed to adapt to other researchers working across 
different sub-sectors of the healthcare continuum in a larger study. These sub studies 
represent different combinations of services and governance/ownership, including 
hospitals, primary care, long-term care homes and medical laboratories (Deber, 2014). By 
using a consistent framework across each subsector, it allows for the comparison across 
subsectors and across jurisdictions to understand the advantages and disadvantages of 
various approaches to accountability (Deber, 2014).  Based on the use of these variables, 
the larger study was able to examine and evaluate the impact, the similarities and 
differences in the policy goals, governance/ownership, and the production characteristics 
of the services they deliver—see special issue Healthcare Policy, Vol. 10 Special Issue, 
Approaches to Accountability, 2014. 
Policy goals. 
A policy goal may contain both processes and outcomes. Policy goals for healthcare 
typically include a combination of access, quality, safety, better value for money (cost 





(IHI) focuses on quality, cost, and value. They work with healthcare organizations to 
move “from ‘volume to value’ to ensure that cost reduction or optimization is driven by 
improvements in clinical and operational quality” (“Quality, Cost, and Value”, 2015). 
More often than not, these policy goals are in conflict. For example, hospitals that are 
increasing efficiencies and are able to provide service to more patients, or provide more 
procedures more effectively are also faced with funding caps, or increasing market share 
while being measured against quality indicators such as wait times and readmission rates. 
Ideally, there should be congruence between the policy goals being sought and what the 
organization is being held accountable for, but often there are perverse and opposing 
incentives (Deber, 2012).  
Governance and ownership.  
The governance and ownership structures in place also vary across jurisdictions and 
across subsectors; they affect who is accountable for what and to whom (Denis, 2004; 
Jordan et al., 2005; Van Kersbergen & Van Waarden, 2004). For-profit organizations are 
required to return the maximum amount of profits to shareholders, while non-profit 
organizations are required to spend allocated resources, and demonstrate their fiduciary 
responsibility, typically to the tax-paying public. The challenge for most Ontario 
healthcare organizations is that allocations from the LHINs that are not spent within a 
fiscal year (with the exceptions of hospitals and occasionally by exception CCACs) are 
required to be returned. This incentive may affect the services they choose to provide and 
the populations they choose to serve. For those organizations that are responsible to more 
than one funder, this can add a layer of complexity (Rhodes, 1997). There is literature 





monitor goals such as quality improvement can exist (Baker et al., 2006; Thomas, 2006). 
A helpful resource is the framework developed by Denis and colleagues (2005) for 
Accreditation Canada, which identifies three governance models: agency, stakeholder, 
and stewardship. 
Characteristics of goods and services. 
The final variable is the characteristics of the goods and services being delivered. 
According to the literature, it is important to examine the characteristics of goods and 
services as they relate to contestability, measurability and complexity (Vining & 
Globerman, 1999; Preker et al., 2000; Deber, 2004; Rico & Puig-Junoy, 2002, Debra, 
2014). Preker and Harding (2000) define contestability as goods/services with low 
barriers to enter or exit the market, versus non-contestable goods/services that have high 
barriers and asset specificity. This describes the goods or services and whether or not the 
transactions within the market have higher value than if these goods or services were 
stand alone or used for another purpose. The measurability of goods/services relates to 
how well a service can be measured based on the process, inputs, outputs, and outcomes 
(Deber, 2014). Monitoring performance is easy when measurability is considered high. 
For example, the measurability of a clinician’s performance is low, as it is difficult to 
determine precise outcomes when there are many factors involved. The final component 
is complexity, which does not rely on the difficulty or intricacy of a good or service. 
Rather, the question to ask is, does this good or service require coordination with other 
providers or is it a stand-alone service (Deber, 2004, 2014). The coordination of 
providers further blurs the lines of accountability and increases complexities when 





same concept is “embeddedness”. Many of the services provided in healthcare gain their 
value by being embedded within a larger system, an example being contracted out 






Section 3 Discussion 
Overview 
 This section of the thesis aims to supplement and provide more detail that 
supports the published article in Section 4. An overview of the qualitative research design 
and subsequent design limitations are discussed, followed by the study limitations and a 
brief summary of the totality of the findings as it relates to the theoretical framework 
identified in Section 2. 
Research Design Overview 
Within in the qualitative paradigm, the research design for this thesis was a case study 
methodology. This approach allows an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon with real-life context, especially when the boundaries of this phenomenon 
and context are not clear (Yin, 2009). This approach allows the researcher to achieve a 
greater understanding for complex concepts, such as accountability, for which little 
information exists in healthcare, and even less for the long-term care sector (Debra, 2012, 
2014; Wyers et al., 2014).  
A benefit of a case study approach is it relies on multiple sources of evidence, and 
benefits from prior development of theoretical approaches to guide data collection and 
analysis (Yin, 2009, 2016). This study is based on the theoretical framework as identified 
and designed by the larger CIHR study of Approaches to Accountability (Deber, 2014). 
The current research uses this framework to identify the advantages and disadvantages of 
the mechanisms used for accountability in long-term care, and why and how certain 





A case study design is the ability to incorporate data from a variety of sources 
including observations, documents, artefacts, and interviews, (Merriam, 1998, Yin, 
2016). The design of this study includes semi-structured interviews as well as document 
review of both the peer-reviewed and grey literatures. This approach is helpful due to the 
limited research and information available on accountability mechanisms used within the 
long-term care sector. 
In addition, a case study approach is also useful in obtaining specific information 
about the human side of an issue, including behaviours and beliefs (Mack et al., 2005). 
Utilizing semi-structured interviews with stakeholders enables the researcher to develop a 
comprehensive understanding of accountability structures and relationships among those 
structures. In-depth interviews are optimal for collecting data on individuals’ personal 
perspectives, histories and experiences (Mack et al., 2005). The premise of a semi-
structured interview is for the researcher to guide the informant while keeping it open 
enough to allow the researcher to probe areas of interest and allow the informant to come 
to their own conclusions (Esterberg, 2002). This design allows for an introduction to each 
topic area, specific and open-ended questions, and summary questions, through a staged 
approach (Bowling & Ebrahim, 2007). The benefit is that the researcher can probe and 
ask additional questions and uncover their framework of meaning (Britten, 1995). This is 
of value in this particular study as it enables the researcher to explore concepts that may 
have not been known at the time of the designing of the research questions based on the 






An ethics proposal was submitted to the UOIT Research Ethics Board in December 
of 2010 and the study received ethics approval from UOIT on April 13, 2011 (see 
Appendix C). Ethical approval was also required from the City of Toronto Long-Term 
Care Homes and Services prior to the collection of data. The ethics proposal was 
submitted March 2012 and approved by the Ethics and Research Committee on July 19, 
2012 (see Appendix D).  
In this research, confidentiality was an important aspect of the research design to 
ensure participation and to reduce possible risk to the informants. Anonymity of 
participants was established within the terms of the Consent Form signed by both the 
investigator and each participant, and by reporting the results (other than those in the 
public domain) in a manner that does not identify any informant. 
Sampling Methodology 
The sample method used in this research was snowball, or chain referral sampling.  
With this method, participants that the researcher has contacted use their social networks 
to refer the researcher to other people who could contribute to the study (Mack, 
Woodsong, Macqueen, Guest, & Namey, 2005). 
In this study, the initial contact was made with the General Manager, City of Toronto 
Long-Term Care Homes and Services. The sample included Directors and Administrators 
within the City of Toronto, Long-Term Care Homes and Services. A list of Long-Term 
Care Home Administrators was provided by the General Manager, which was then 
utilized to recruit additional informants. After receipt of the mailing list from the 





interview (see Appendix E) with an attached consent form (see Appendix F). There were 
14 individuals contacted. One individual retired while the interview process was 
underway, and was not replaced, and another individual was on sick leave.  Of the 12 
available informants, seven individuals consented to be interviewed, three from senior 
leadership and four LTC home Administrators,  
 
Data Collection 
Data was collected though semi-structured interviews and document review. Semi-
structured interviews were conducted with key informants within the City of Toronto 
Long-Term Care Homes and Services division.  
Data collection occurred in two different formats, in-person interviews and telephone 
interviews. The different format was chosen based on geographic location and time 
constraints of the researcher and informants. Telephone interviews have equal accuracy 
rates as face-to-face interviews (Bowling & Ebrahim, 2007). The interviews ranged from 
one to two hours. There was no incentive offered to informants participating in this study. 
The data obtained during the interviews were collected by a digital recording device, as 
well as hand-written notes by the researcher. It was imperative to the researcher that there 
were no consequences intended or otherwise in order for informants to speak freely and 
to ensure the anonymity of their responses, as this could potential impact funding or 
employment. 
The interview guide was created in collaboration with other members of the research 
team as part of the larger study and was provided to the researcher (see Appendix G). The 





wordsmithing of the questions prior to being finalized for the two research projects on 
long-term care as part of the larger study. The guide was based on themes and questions 
that were identified based on the literature review conducted as part of the larger research 
grant and utilized by the research partners who were completing the similar study with 
privately delivered long-term care homes (Berta, Laporte & Woodchis, 2014). The 
rationale for having a consistent interview guide was to allow for the various sub-studies 
to be able to compare and contrast commonalities and differences across sub-sectors 
across the healthcare continuum with the application of the same conceptual framework- 
see special issue Healthcare Policy, Vol. 10 Special Issue, Approaches to Accountability, 
2014. The intention of this thesis and research was not to compare and contrast across 
subsectors, but rather to identify what approaches to accountability are used in publically 
funded publically delivered long-term care homes.  
Data Analysis 
In a case study design, data analysis requires key phases to be completed, such as 
organization of data, coding, creating themes, and patterns, and then synthesizing the data 
and utilizing literature to explain findings. The interviews were transcribed using voice 
audio device and reviewed to ensure that nothing was missed. A coding system used was 
then created for each interview and used throughout the transcription when individuals 
were mentioned; for example, M1 for a specific manager. 
The transcriptions were coded using themes of the policy instruments and 
independent variables as outlined in the theoretical framework. Additional themes also 





such as unintended consequences of accountability, resourcing, contracted-out services, 
and the impact of LHINs. 
Design Limitations 
In qualitative research, one must demonstrate that a level of rigour has been 
completed in order to defend the quality of the qualitative research process. Polit & Beck 
(2011) outline five key areas that support rigour for the research paradigm. This next 
section will review each of the areas and then describe how the research design addresses 
these areas. Figure 4 provides an overview. 
Figure 4: Qualitative Approach to Rigour (Polit & Beck, 2011). 
Table 1 
 
Qualitative Approach to Rigour (Polit & Beck, 2011). 
Qualitative Area How is This Demonstrated? 
Credibility 
 Triangulation 
 Peer Debriefing 
Dependability & 
Confirmability 
 Utilized anonymity to reduce reflexivity 




 Stakeholder engagement 
 Peer review 
 Triangulation 
 
 The first area in the research paradigm is credibility, which is defined as the value 
and believability of the findings (Polit & Beck, 2011).  Dependability is often compared 





(Rolfe, 2006). Confirmability is the neutrality and accuracy of the data and is closely 
linked with dependability as the processes for establishing both are similar.  
Transferability “refers to whether particular findings can be transferred to another 
similar context or situation, while still preserving the meanings and inferences from the 
completed study” (Leininger, 1994). Authenticity “that both the conduct and evaluation 
of research are genuine and credible not only in terms of participants’ lived experiences 
but also with respect to the wider political and social implications of research” (Polit and 
Beck, 2011). The methods utilized to provide rigour in this qualitative research include 
triangulation, reflexivity, peer review, and debriefing and stakeholder engagement. 
Triangulation was a method utilized in this study to ensure accuracy of the data collected 
and to validate interpretations and meanings. Triangulation is defined as using multiple 
data collection methods in order to provide sureness in the interpretation of the results 
from the data analysis (Yin, 2003; 2016). In this study, document review (legislation, 
regulations, and agreements) and informant interviews were used to illustrate 
“converging lines in inquiry” (Yin, 2003, p.73). 
In order to demonstrate reflexivity, anonymity was used. Due to the reporting 
relationships between the senior leadership at the City and the Administrators of the 
home, all identifying or potentially identifying data was removed prior to publishing. 
This was identified to reduce any reflexivity from the participants. Reflectivity is when 
the participant tells the researcher what they want to hear (Yin, 2009, 2016). This was 
important in this research because of the potential conflicts or perceived conflicts of 
discussing accountability structures with current funders and employment status. For 





To ensure reliability, one transcript in NVivo11 was coded by another person who 
was familiar with accountability and long-term care.  The volunteer was given a briefing 
on the nature of the study and was provided the initial article on which the study was 
based and was asked to code one of the interviews with the pre-determined themes. The 
result from the coding comparison resulted in an 87% agreement with that of the 
researcher. This step reduced the chance of researcher bias and provided credibility of the 
coding process (Richards, 2005).  
Peer review and debriefing occurred throughout the process of analysis; this included 
checking the findings and themes against various stakeholders within the study including 
other researchers and partners, meetings to discuss the findings, and sharing writing for 
comments and feedback.  
The stakeholder engagement in the accountability process included collaborative 
participation (with a larger provincial study, including representatives from key 
stakeholder groups, other researchers, and research assistants), the establishment of 
partnerships with key stakeholders, development of the research questions and research 
design, collection of data, data entry, data analysis, and the authoring of a published 
paper.  
Study Limitations 
The research study used a case study design, with the collection of data through semi-
structured interviews and document review. The following section describes limitations 
that were experienced by the researcher. 
The researcher’s bias was declared at the onset, as the researcher had previous work 





administration of accountability agreements within the long term care homes. This helped 
with credibility of the research, but also emphasized the importance of rigour, and the 
control for rigour in the research design, in order to minimize investigator bias and to 
maximize the accuracy and validity of the interpretation (Yin, 2003, 2016).   Control for 
researcher bias did not interfere with or alter their perception of the data and any insights 
offered (Creswell, 2014). 
Access to key informants was initially obtained through one senior team member who 
was able to provide the contact details of the potential informants from City of Toronto’s 
head office and all ten homes. The researcher made initial individual contact with each 
identified individual, during which very few participants (only one) volunteered for the 
study. A second request was made to all individuals, but this was done through senior 
leadership after they had participated in the study. While the senior leadership did not 
know who had volunteered for the study, there was the potential that respondents may 
have learned about the study prior to their official interview.  
The sample size of the qualitative portion of this study was small (n = 7). This could 
affect the diversity and variability in responses. However, there was a fair split of those 
informants from the senior leadership team (n = 3) compared to those who were 
administrators (n = 4). Three attempts were made to increase the sample size; although 
there was only a 58% response rate, this may not have captured all the views of the 
administrators who are employed with the City of Toronto Long-Term Care Homes and 
Services. Data saturation was achieved as the researcher did not generate any new data 
after the 7
th





occurred when interviews were not revealing any new information, but instead, repeated 
what was already captured by previous respondents. 
In semi-structured interviews, a guideline of interview questions was utilized (see 
Appendix G). This guideline was provided to the researcher and was not modified. One 
of the modifications to the questionnaire would have been to ask the informants what was 
their own definition of accountability and compare and contrast to those definitions 
provided in the literature. 
In addition to study limitations, study delimitations can also been identified by the 
researcher. Study delimitations refer to those limitations that can be controlled by the 
researcher (Simon, 2011). The theoretical framework, policy instruments and the 
variables selected are just one approach in reviewing accountability. As well the 
sampling methodology and informant selection also has a boundary or limit on what 
findings that can be ascertained by the researcher. 
Summary of Results 
 In addition to the results in the published article, the following section details 
some additional findings and identifies the linkages with the theoretical framework. 
Ontario ranks among the lowest of the Canadian provinces as it relates to long-term 
care funding. Spending for this sector has increased 1% per year since 2011, while total 
healthcare spending has increase by 4.8% in the same time period (“2017 OLTCA 
Budget Submission”, 2016). In 2016, 4.07 billion dollars was allocated to long-term care, 
7.9% of the overall health budget (“About long-term care in Ontario, 2018). In multiple 
publications, the need for increased funding has been lobbied, as the care needs of 





equipment. Individuals pay a portion of these services, unlike other healthcare costs such 
as surgical procedures, which are covered 100%.  
Regulations. 
This policy instrument exercises the regulation concept which acts as a rule book for 
providers to act and behave in a certain way. All key informants in this study 
acknowledged that regulation was the main approach to achieving accountability in the 
long-term care sector.  
The major underpinning and reform of long-term care homes was generated by the 
passing of the Long-Term Care Home Act, 2007 (LTCHA), commonly referred to as “the 
Act”. The Act, that was effective July 2010, replaced three discreet acts that governed 
Ontario’s different models of LTCH’s; The Nursing Home Act (this was for-profit 
homes), the Charitable Institution Act (non-for-profit homes) and the Homes for the Aged 
and Rest Homes Act (municipal homes, including the 10 homes run by the City of 
Toronto) (Berta et al., 2014). MOHLTC's LTCH Compliance Management Program was 
redesigned to align with the LTCHA. The Long-Term Care Home Quality Inspection 
Program ensures that LTCHs are meeting the criteria and standards that are identified in 
the MOHLTC policy and licensing agreements, as well as conditions within the L-SAA 
(Berta et al., 2014).  
 Some informants stated it was difficult to meet all the requirements of the Act and 
its regulations. The Act and regulations have over 440 requirements for each home to 
meet. The Compliance Management Program was redesigned to support the enforcement 
of these requirements. If a home is found non-compliant with the requirements, the 





funding or ordering the LHIN to withhold funding (LTCHA, s. 154(4)). The Ministry 
may also penalize homes for non-compliance with an amount not to exceed $50 per bed, 
per day (LTCHA, s. 155). 
Another organization that key informants described as being involved in the 
regulation of the long-term care sector was Accreditation Canada. While all Ontario 
LTCHs must be licensed through MOHLTC, most voluntarily seek accreditation through 
Accreditation Canada, a non-governmental entity that evaluates nursing homes and 
assists them in meeting regulations and compliance (see also Mitchell et al. 2014).  While 
accreditation is a voluntary process, one LHIN has made this a mandatory reporting 
performance requirement within the L-SAA, 
Although the ECFAA regulation was not applicable to long-term care homes at the 
time of the interviews, the Excellent Care for All Act, 2010 (ECFAA) is also an important 
piece of legislation to ensure “high quality, integrated care for all patients, clients and 
residents [as the] the goal of everyone involved in delivering healthcare in Ontario” 
(Quality Improvement Plan (QIP) Guidance Document for Ontario’s Healthcare 
Organizations., 2014, p.3). ECFAA requires healthcare facilities (hospitals, CCAC, 
CHCs, and LTCHs), to develop and post annual quality improvement plans (QIPs). In 
addition, hospitals are also required to implement patient and employee satisfaction 
surveys, link executive compensation to achievement of QIP indicators, and create a 
quality committee that reports to the Board of Directors (MOHLTC, 2015). At the time of 
this study, these requirements were not required for long-term care homes, but they could 






Financial incentives are defined in the literature as a concept that rewards 
performance, behaviours, or actions that would not otherwise occur with monetary 
rewards (Woodchis, 2004). Currently, there are no financial incentives or rewards within 
the long-term care sector, unlike the hospital sector emergency department Pay-for 
Results initiative, (MOHLTC, 2015). There is the requirement to maintain a balanced 
budget within LTCHs and there may in fact be financial ramifications if this requirement 
is not met. All informants agreed that they were required to create budgets and stay 
within the financial resources as allocated by the LHINs and any additional resources 
from the City of Toronto.  
Some key informants from the interviews spoke to what they consider to be a 
deficiency in the complex funding formula; the funding allocation is not timely and 
unable to adapt to the changing needs of a home. To support the complex funding 
formula, full-scale implementation of the RAI-MDS in Ontario's LTCHs began in 2010. 
RAI-MDS provides a comprehensive functional and clinical assessment of residents and 
is intended for use in resident-care planning and evidence-based decision-making. 
Informants acknowledged the benefits of having additional funding through the City of 
Toronto and identified this helps reduce the financial burden placed on homes. The 
additional resources from the City of Toronto, as well as the ability to move funds among 
the 10 homes, supports financial pressures and emergencies such as repairs or capital 






The literature review identified that in healthcare settings, information was best 
disseminated through reports such as balanced scorecards or report cards (Howells, 2005; 
Morris & Zelmer 2005). This study showed that information sharing is only a portion of 
how the long-term care sector achieves accountability. The challenge is that there are 
limited meaningful reports available. Key informants believed the challenges with public 
reporting are the indicator selection and how they directly support quality and 
accountability. For example there are many different ways to addressed quality of care 
for residents, but only one indicators has been selected (pressure ulcers).  As stated by the 
informants, there may be other indicators that support quality of care and accountability.  
Performance expectations are publicly available from the L-SAA, which is mandated 
to be publicly available online as well as visible in all homes. In order to report on some 
of the provincially mandated indicators, Health Quality Ontario’s (HQO) public reporting 
portal is utilized. HQO maintains its own LTCH public reporting website which provides 
performance data for each LTCH in Ontario. These indicators are reported or each home 
as well as how homes are doing relative to provincial averages for falls, incontinence, 
pressure ulcers, and restraint use. A view that was seen by many informants was the 
additional requirements needed to be put in place and no additional resources to meet the 
demand for public reporting. Informants also indicated the need for standard definitions 
of these indicators and how they relate to overall patient care if they are truly to be used 





Professionalism and stewardship. 
The role of professionalism is far less emphasized in long-term care as compared to 
other healthcare sectors. This study showed the role of professionalism and stewardship 
is not utilized in the long-term care sector to achieve accountability. This is largely due to 
the low involvement of professional staff, those who are considered a regulated health 
professional, accountable to an association (i.e. RNs), in the delivery of care for the 
residents. Most of the direct resident care (~80%) is delivered by unregulated workers: 
healthcare aides (HCAs) and personal support workers (PSWs) (Berta, 2013). There is 
minimal physician oversight, with managerial and clinical roles carried out 
predominantly by registered nurses (RNs) and registered practical nurses (RPNs) (Berta, 
Laporte & Woodchis, 2014). For these professionals, there are best practice documents 
and guidelines supported through their regulatory associations (RNAO, RPNAO). These 
associations allow for tracking, monitoring, and licencing of RNs and RPNs, and ensure 
nursing competencies as set out by their governing bodies.  
While professionalism as traditionally constructed may play less of a role in LTC, 
there may be a future for unions to play a role in ensuring standards of care. Currently 
there are 90,000 PSWs that provide support to long-term care homes, hospitals, and 
community programs in Ontario (OLTCA, 2017). The Canadian Union of Public 
Employees represents 24,000 workers, and the Canadian Auto Workers Union represents 
16,000 workers in Ontario's LTC sectors (Berta, Laporte & Wodchis, 2014). 
Blended approach of regulation and information. 
One of the findings outside of the framework was the concept of a blended approach 





approach combines the compliance program that enforces the regulations through the use 
of publicly reported findings and inspection reports. Informants expressed discomfort 
with the education surrounding public reporting in the compliance program, stating the 
general public will just see “non-compliant” and will have little context to what this 
means for a home.  
One of the key features of the Compliance Management Program is transparency. 
This is achieved by having the inspection documentation and protocols available to 
homes, so they know what to expect and can incorporate these into their own education 
or quality improvement programs. In addition, copies of the public version of inspection 
reports detailing all findings of non-compliance must be publicly posted in LTC Homes, 
publicly posted on the Ministry’s website and provided to Residents’ and Family 
Councils (MOHLTC, 2015). When reviewing these reports online, there is a glossary of 
terms used for each report that is posted.  There is not an overall rating for each home 
that identifies a severity scale or summary of the issues or orders without reviewing every 
report individually. The language for the general public who are not familiar with long-
term care or the regulations and the Act may find this difficult to comprehend, supporting 
the informant’s ideas around misinterpretation of results.  
Independent variables.  
 This section will examine the views of the key informants on the independent 
variables and will strive to determine the relationships between structures and 






The policy goals for long-term care are consistent with other sectors where there is a 
dichotomy between quality initiatives and regulations, and the limited funding to achieve 
these goals. There are minimal increases to funding allocations annually, yet the cost of 
doing business continues to increase and the pressure to provide value for money and a 
quality service continues to rise.  
In the LTC sector, the balance of fulfilling the Act and associated regulations, with 
capped funding and increasing acuity and complexity of residents, is a daily struggle. 
Decisions are made to meet the needs of the residents, and provide high quality care 
while balancing financial indicators, such as a balanced budget, sick and overtime 
benchmarks and the increasing pressures of publicly reported quality and compliance 
indicators. For example, the indicator ‘percent of residents who were physically 
restrained’ is reported annually by Health Quality Ontario, as well as an indicator 
identified in the L-SAA. There are many facets in which a home will need to address to 
ensure this indicator is favourable. The education for staff on how and when to use a 
restraint needs to be in place, costing additional training dollars. The staffing ratios may 
also play a role into the use of restraints, as well as activities and programing for the 
residents. This is an example where additional resources are required, potentially making 
the financial indicators unfavorable while ensuring the publicly reported indicators are 
favorable.  
Governance and ownership. 
This section discusses the multiple governance/ownership structures and relationships 





one variable in which different approaches to accountability were identified. The findings 
from the interview data demonstrated that key informants all identified the same three 
bodies to which they were accountable:  The City of Toronto, the LHINs, and the 
residents of the homes. But, these varied based on what they were accountable for doing. 
There was also a varying degree of accountability identified as arms-length providers, 
e.g., the tax payer who provides funding to the City of Toronto or the Ministry of Health 
(whose funds originate from the tax payer) whom provides funding to the LHINs. All 
respondents stated that multiple lines of accountability made it difficult to be 
accountable.  For example, one respondent stated, “we have many masters”. This is 
another important finding because the literature suggests when evaluating accountability, 
one size does not fit all and there is a need to define accountability for what and to whom 
(Deber, 2012). 
The LTC sector is accountable to many different bodies. The major funder is the 
Local Health Integration Network (LHINs) and, depending on the type of home, there is a 
Board of Directors or Head office to which the homes would also be accountable. 
Accountability to the Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care involves a few branches 
within the ministry: (Compliance, Financial Management Branch) -- and ultimately tax 
payers and communities in which the homes provide services to their residents.  
The City of Toronto Long-Term Care Homes have a second layer of accountability, 
as their funding is supplemented by the City of Toronto and the tax payers who 
contribute to this additional funding allocation. The homes are required to comply with 
City of Toronto policies and procedures, in addition to the Act and regulations set out by 





Several key informants also identified other organizations and bodies to whom they 
were accountable. These include family members of residents, staff, Health Quality 
Ontario, regulatory bodies, students and volunteers, and Accreditation Canada.  
It was identified in this study that there was no one body or organization that the 
long-term care sector was chiefly accountable to. When asked to respond to the question, 
“to whom are you chiefly accountable to?”, the response varied across depending on what 
the homes were accountable for. All respondents identified they were accountable for the 
financial resources both from the LHINs and the City of Toronto. All respondents spoke 
to the importance of maintaining a balanced budget and to demonstrate fiscal 
responsibility of tax payers’ dollars. Informants described that they were ultimately 
accountable to the resident with respect to quality of care and safety. This was identified 
by respondents in ensuring that all the regulations in the Act are met. One informant 
identified that the use of compliance reporting and quality performance indicators were 
used to gauge how well these policy goals were being achieved. Two examples of 
performance indicators that can speak to quality of resident care are rate of pressure 
ulcers and falls.  
Characteristics of goods and services. 
All informants described the process “very difficult to near impossible” to no longer 
be in the business of providing long-term care homes for residents of Toronto. The 
services that long-term care homes provide is residential 24-hour nursing and support 
services. Based on the regulations of approved or licensed beds, the MOHLTC must 
approve any changes to ownership of the beds. In addition, approval from the LHINS is 





finding is that the services that the City of Toronto LTC homes provide are non-
contestable., meaning removing themselves from the market is extremely difficult and 
requires multiple approvals.  
The other characteristic to review within this is the measurability of the services 
provided. Key informants provided some important findings regarding the measurability 
of this sector. In addition to the public reporting, respondents commented on the informal 
reporting through resident and family councils, as well as corporate scorecards and data 
collection within the Division. All LTCHs are very measurable, as there are many ways 
to assess long-term care services, including resident and staff satisfaction, compliance 
orders and reports, financial reporting, quality indicators such as pressure ulcers and falls.  
The final component is the assessment of complexity of the services, which relates to 
the coordination of services provided. The complexity lies with the process of applying, 
and selecting a long-term care home, that may have extensive wait lists for any one 
particular home. Once a resident has been placed in a home based on their choices and 
facilitated through the Community Care Access Centre, there is minimal coordination 
required as compared to other components of the healthcare system (i.e. hospital or 
community services). There are processes in place to provide the daily support to the 
residents which include nursing care, activation and meal services. This is standard 
practice in Ontario and is true for both private and publicly run homes.    
All key informants were asked to comment on contracted out services. An important 
finding in this study is that all informants acknowledged that some services within long-
term care should be contracted out. These services included difficult to recruit positions 





music therapy, art therapy and spiritual care coordinators. Some key informants identified 
the benefits of having third party service contracts for physiotherapy and occupational 
therapists. This suggests lower costs and reduced human resource efforts in recruitment 
and performance management. On more than one occasion, when asked if there were 
services you would never contract out, the response was “never, say never”, but all 
respondents suggested that personal nursing care would not be beneficial to contract out. 
An important finding in this study based on document review and qualitative analysis 
is that long-term care sector is non-contestable and has a high degree of measurability 
and complexity. While the complexity within a long-term care home can vary depending 
on the services contracted out, there is much more value in having the embeddedness 
within the continuum of care when residents are selecting and transitioning into a long-
term care home from a variety of settings- home, retirement home, or hospital.  
Summary 
Accountability within healthcare has been identified as an area of interest by many 
sources as a platform to reform healthcare (Deber, 2011, 2014). In Canada specifically, 
consumers of the healthcare system are demanding greater vertical and horizontal 
accountability from government and healthcare providers (Schacter, 2000; Flood & 
Choudhry, 2001; Kirby, 2001; Maxwell, 2002). This thesis looks at one aspect of the 
healthcare continuum, of the ten publically funded, publically delivered City of Toronto’s 
long-term care homes in Ontario. 
The policy instruments that support the long-term care home sector and specifically 
the City of Toronto long-term care homes are regulations, financial incentives and 





80% of the staff providing direct patients care are unregulated healthcare professionals. 
The independent variables that are examined in relation to the policy instruments are 
policy goals, governance/ownership, and services that are being delivered. For all 
variables, the level of complexity increases for those LTC homes within the City of 
Toronto based on the fact of an additional level of accountability to the Division. 
The investigation of accountability has both positive and negative impacts on the 
publicly funded and publicly delivered long-term, care homes in the City of Toronto. 
Answering questions as who is accountable to whom, and for what, and how this 
accountability is demonstrated, and if there are any consequences or resource constraints 
are research questions that this thesis and the published article in the next section 
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Section 4 Manuscript 
Accountability in the City of Toronto’s 10 Long-Term Care Homes from Healthcare 
Policy, 10(Special Issue), 99–109. 
Abstract 
Long-term care (LTC) residential homes provide a supportive environment for 
residents requiring nursing care and assistance with daily living activities. The LTC 
sector is highly regulated. We examine the approaches taken to ensure the delivery of 
quality and safe care in 10 LTC homes owned and operated by the City of Toronto, 
Ontario, focusing on mandatory accountability agreements with the Local Health 
Integration Networks (LHINs). Results are based on document review and seven 
interviews with LTC managers responsible for the management and operation of the 10 
LTC homes. One issue identified was the challenges associated with implementing new 
legislative and regulatory requirements to multiple bodies with differing requirements, 
particularly when boundaries do not coincide (e.g., the City of Toronto's Long-Term Care 
Homes and Services Division must establish 10 different accountability agreements with 
the five LHINs that span into the City of Toronto's geographic area). 
Like other countries, Canada's population is aging. By 2026, it is estimated that one in 
five Canadians will have reached the age of 65 years (Health Canada and 
Interdepartmental Committee on Aging and Seniors Issues 2002). Supporting this aging 
population will require efforts directed at implementing strategies for healthy aging. This 
includes the provision of supportive environments within communities for seniors and 
sustainable government programs (Health Canada and Interdepartmental Committee on 





Residential long-term care (LTC) homes provide a supportive environment and 24-
hour nursing care for the small but vulnerable proportion of seniors and other individuals 
who are unable to live on their own due to cognitive/physical impairment, challenges 
with daily living activities and/or the lack of informal support. Although the number of 
LTC beds across Canada per 1,000 seniors has remained stable, the level of care has 
become more intense due to more complex conditions and health needs. Overall, the 
majority of residents in LTC homes in Canada are female, single, over the age of 85 years 
old, and cognitively impaired (CIHI 2011). 
The provision of safe, quality and efficient residential LTC for this vulnerable 
population is a high priority for residents, families, governments and providers. LTC 
homes are not required to be a publicly insured service under the terms of the Canada 
Health Act (Madore 2005). Nonetheless, most jurisdictions cover a proportion of the 
costs for certain populations (Berta et al. 2006). A number of different funding models 
exist that rely on a mix of public (e.g., provincial/territorial and municipal governments) 
and private (e.g., private insurance, co-payments paid by residents) sources. Variation 
also exists across Canada in terms of ownership status of the homes (Berta et al. 2006). 
Although there are many unregulated LTC homes (often called "retirement homes"), the 
formal LTC sector in Ontario is highly regulated and must respond to a variety of 
legislative/regulatory measures and policy decisions made by different levels of 
government. 
Currently in Ontario, there are approximately 77,605 residents in 628 regulated LTC 
homes (Ontario Association of Non-Profit Homes and Services for Seniors 2013). Recent 





home sector. The Long-Term Care Task Force on Resident Care and Safety in Ontario 
was established in 2011 in response to these reports highlighting the need to recognize 
the rights of residents to receive quality care in a safe, respectful environment free of 
abuse; it has issued progress reports (Long-Term Care Task Force on Resident Care and 
Safety 2013). Providing quality and safe care for LTC residents is also a high priority for 
Ontario's Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care (MOHLTC). In a January 2013 press 
release, the Minister of the MOHLTC stated: "My ministry has been working closely 
with task force members, and I am proud of the actions and recent investments the 
ministry has made to further support long-term care homes, and staff to improve the care 
and safety of residents" (http://www.newswire.ca/en/story/1106837/working-together-to-
provide-safe-care-to-residents-in-long-term-care). 
Purpose 
Ontario's LTC homes can be categorized into three sub-sectors, based on their public–
private ownership status: private not-for-profit (e.g., religious or lay groups), private for-
profit (e.g., individual, private organizations or corporations) and public (e.g., City of 
Toronto's LTC homes) (Berta et al. 2006). This study focuses on the 10 public LTC 
homes owned by the City of Toronto, Ontario; a companion paper in this volume deals 
with other private LTC homes in Ontario (Berta et al. 2014). Responsibility for both the 
operation and management of these 10 homes rests with the City of Toronto's Long-Term 
Care Homes and Services Division (the Division). The Division is responsible for 
providing a variety of long-term healthcare services in the City of Toronto. A number of 
different factors influence the quality and care delivered to residents, including 





statement is to "…provide a continuum of high quality long-term care services to eligible 
adults in both long-term care homes and the community." The Division is guided by a set 
of core values: Compassion, Accountability, Respect and Excellence (CARE). The 
CARE values are intended to be shared by all stakeholders, drive culture and priorities 
and provide a framework in which all decisions are based. A general manager, three 
directors and 10 administrators, along with a number of other senior staff, provide overall 
leadership to the Division using a participatory style of management that involves shared 
decision-making and shared responsibility for the Division's performance. 
City of Toronto's 10 LTC Homes 
Each of the 10 LTC homes has an administrator whose primary focus is on the 
operations of that particular home. A variety of healthcare, social care and administrative 
staff provide "nursing and personal care, medical, recreational, rehabilitation, nutritional, 
spiritual, social work, housekeeping, laundry and administrative services." Volunteers 
also play an important role providing assistance, visitations, programs and activities for 
the residents. 
The City's LTC homes have 2,641 approved beds (17.3% of the regulated LTC beds 
in Toronto) and provide permanent, convalescent and short-stay accommodations to a 
diverse population (mainly seniors) from more than 50 countries of origin and speaking 
38 languages. The Division's decision-making framework for providing support and 
activities for the 10 LTC homes takes into account the cultural, religious and sexual 
diversity of their residents, as well as diverse abilities such as the level of cognitive 
ability. The majority of permanent residents have some form of cognitive impairment and 





In 2006, the Ontario government implemented the regionalization of healthcare 
services with the introduction of 14 Local Health Integration Networks (LHINs). Each 
LHIN is responsible for the planning, integration and funding of specified health services 
in its region, including hospitals and community care, as well as LTC services. To ensure 
the responsible use of healthcare resources, accountability agreements between healthcare 
providers and LHINs and between LHINs and government have been established. The 
LHIN boundaries are not necessarily co-terminus with those of the local government. 
Toronto falls into five different LHINs, some of which also encompass areas outside the 
city boundaries. Accordingly, the 10 public LTC homes operated by the Division are 
situated in five different LHINs, and this has resulted in the establishment of 10 different 
accountability agreements with five different LHINs. We examine the approaches taken 
to ensure the delivery of quality and safe care in LTC homes owned by the City of 
Toronto by focusing on the challenges and/or benefits resulting from these accountability 
agreements. 
Methodology 
Data collection for this case study used data triangulation from more than one type of 
data source to give more insight into the sub-sector and to identify more easily any 
inconsistencies found between the data (Bickman and Rog 1998). We used a combination 
of document review and in-depth interviews with seven LTC managers from the City of 
Toronto's Long-Term Care Homes and Services Division who are responsible for 
implementing the accountability requirements within this sub-sector. Participants were 
each given a unique identifier, e.g., M1, M2, etc. Participants provided informed consent 





of Technology and the City of Toronto Long-Term Care Homes and Services Division 
provided ethics approval. One-hour semi-structured interviews were conducted via 
telephone or in person. 
Documents reviewed included peer-reviewed literature, grey literature (e.g., 
professional association websites) and provincial legislation and regulations. The City of 
Toronto Long-Term Care Homes and Services Division provided strategic directions 
documents, report cards, efficiency review documents; annual reports and long-term care 
home service accountability agreements (L-SAAs). Following identification of the 
relevant documents, each was summarized and reviewed by at least two members of the 
research team (which included at least one expert from the LTC sub-sector) to ensure 
consensus. Similar procedures were used for the coding of the key informant interviews 
to validate the themes identified. 
Results 
Approaches to accountability. 
In terms of "to whom," our respondents noted multiple layers. They noted that 
providing quality and safe care to the residents was the first and most important priority 
and that they believed that the Division was accordingly primarily: 
…accountable to the residents and their families, who in some cases provide a co-
payment for their accommodations … and by extension we are accountable to the local 
citizens. (M1) 
However, management is not only accountable to the residents and their families but 





The Division receives funding and therefore is financially accountable to the Province 
of Ontario, Central East LHIN, Toronto Central LHIN, Central LHIN, Central West 
LHIN and Mississauga/Halton LHIN and the City of Toronto Council. (M2) 
While respondents agreed, "there are many layers" (M3) of accountability, they 
agreed that primary governance and oversight lies with Toronto's City Council: even 
though the majority of the funding is from the province, they [City Council] have 
governance over the operations. (M1) 
In terms of how, accountability in this sub-sector uses a combination of all four 
mechanisms of accountability (financial incentives, regulation, information directed to 
potential users and reliance on professionalism) identified in the conceptual framework 
(Deber 2014). These do not entirely derive from the government. For example, the Long-
Term Care Task Force on Resident Care and Safety in Ontario released an 18-item action 
plan in 2012 to improve safety in Ontario's LTC homes (Long-Term Care Task Force 
Ontario 2012). A subsequent report provided educational/training strategies for staff (i.e., 
professionalism) and support tools for staff and families (i.e., information directed to 
potential users), as well as earmarking resources (i.e., financial incentives) for the 
recruitment of qualified clinical, support and administrative staff (Long-Term Care Task 
Force on Resident Care and Safety 2013). 
Role of regulation. 
Regulation plays a significant role in ensuring accountability in the LTC home sector 
in Ontario. In the opinion of one respondent: "After nuclear power plants, long-term care 





In respect to whether the Division or LTC homes have any influence over these 
regulations, one respondent commented: 
We have an opportunity to influence policy … or influence the direction of various 
legislation or regulations, and certainly provide evidence to the direction in which change 
needs to be made. (M1) 
All regulated LTC homes in Ontario are licensed and approved by the MOHLTC. 
Regardless of the ownership status (private not-for-profit, private for-profit and public), 
LTC homes are governed by the Long-Term Care Homes Act (LTCH) of 2007 and 
Ontario Regulation 79/10 (Legislative Assembly of Ontario 2007). In addition, a variety 
of other legislation and regulations apply to this sector, as noted by two respondents from 
the senior management team: 
They [regulations] are all specified from the Ministry standpoint, long-term care 
home acts, including homemakers and nurses' services, health and safety, privacy 
(MFIPPA [the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act] and 
PHIPA [the Personal Health Information Protection Act]), and so many others … even 
the AODA … the fire code, lots [of others] as well. (M5) 
The Act … public health requirements, Ministry of Labour, Health Quality Ontario 
… there are many, many layers. (M6) 
The LTCH Act and Regulation 79/10 are considered the foundation of the Ontario 
government's commitment to reforming the accountability of LTC homes. LTC homes 
are accountable for providing safe, respectful, quality health and social care services, as 
well as safeguarding residents' rights. The Long-Term Care Homes' Quality Inspection 





Health Quality Ontario (HQO) makes the data available to the public on the Ontario 
MOHLTC website. 
Accreditation processes are overseen by Accreditation Canada or the Commission on 
Accreditation of Rehabilitation Facilities and are encouraged by MOHLTC through 
financial incentives to accredited LTC homes. Two of the LHINs to which the Division 
must report (Central East and Central West LHINs where three LTC homes are located) 
go beyond this and require accreditation by a recognized Canadian accreditation program 
as a performance requirement. In 2012, the City of Toronto's Long-Term Care Homes 
and Services was awarded Accreditation with Exemplary Standing by Accreditation 
Canada, their highest level of performance recognition in meeting the requirements of the 
Qmentum accreditation program (Mitchell et al. 2014). 
Long-term care home service accountability agreements. 
With the enactment of the Local Health System Integration Act (LHSIA) in 2006, the 
LHINs began the negotiation of service accountability agreements (SAAs) between the 
LHINs and health service providers (HSPs) funded by the LHINs in accordance with the 
timetable set out in LHSIA, O.Reg. 279. LHINs were originally expected to enter into 
SAAs with LTC homes by March 31, 2010; however, the L-SAA was developed within 
the context of the LTCH Act. The L-SAAs are for a period of three years. Accordingly, 
LTC homes signed their first L-SAA on July 1, 2010, concomitant with the date of 
proclamation of the LTCH Act, and were effective until March 31, 2013. 
The LHINs have an accountability framework that supports their legislative 
requirements with respect to the LTC sector, but this framework acts only as a guideline. 





final year of the agreement. The beginning of this cycle is the Long-Term Care Home 
Accountability Planning Submission (LAPS). The LAPS informs discussion with the 
LHIN in regards to the L-SAA. It provides a tool for homes to describe their services, and 
is composed of two parts: (a) an overview of the LTC home that includes general 
identifying information, bed types and numbers offered within the home, structural 
classification and listing of additional services provided to residents; and (b) the Service 
Plan narrative, which will allow the LTC home to provide information that describes 
services that the home operates or plans to operate within each year of the agreement. 
There are strict instructions on how this is to be completed. The LAPS documents 
facilitate discussions with the LHIN and become appendices to the L-SAA. 
Commenting on the accountability process and who had final say on the contents of 
the L-SAA, one respondent indicated: 
We had input and some opportunity with respect to the development of service 
accountability agreements, but they are accountability agreements and not contracts, so 
you don't necessarily negotiate them, you discuss, you provide feedback but in the end 
they [LHIN] can prescribe, and in some respects it had been prescribed. (M3) 
There was consensus from the respondents that there was oversight provided from the 
Division at the provincial L-SAA Steering Committee (in the formulation of the 
agreements). 
While there is guidance from the provincial steering committee to align the processes 
and to provide guidance to the LHINs, each LHIN ultimately has flexibility on how it 
carries out the L-SAA process. One result is that timelines may vary for each LHIN, and 





L-SAA is having the submission and agreement endorsed by the governing body and 
executed by two signing authorities that can bind the organizations. For the Division, this 
means having City Council approval, which requires time for management to review and 
obtain the necessary approvals, and often this process does not coincide with the LHINs' 
timelines. 
Performance indicators. 
Another portion of the L-SAA agreement that varies by LHIN is the performance 
indicators used to measure the HSPs' performance and tools used for demonstrating 
accountability. The L-SAA Indicators Working Group is responsible for developing 
recommendations for consideration by the L-SAA Steering Committee regarding L-SAA 
performance indicators. The Working Group is composed of LTC sector representatives, 
MOHLTC, HQO and LHIN staff, and is chaired by an LHIN Senior Director of the 
Health System Indicator Initiative Steering Committee. For the 2013–2016 L-SAA, the 
working group created the following sets of indicators to reflect the Pan-LHIN "Ontario" 
systems imperative: Enhancing Coordination and Transitions of Care; Maintaining 
Achievements in Access, Accountability and Safety; and Ensuring Sustainable 
Organizational Health. Within these categories, there were four indicators that were in 
every L-SAA. Each indicator has a performance target, performance corridor and a 
performance standard. Because the Division has LTC homes situated in five different 
LHINs, it must thus comply with five different processes. This has implications for the 
Division's financial and human resources. Even within one LHIN, there are differences 





In addition to the four Pan-LHIN indicators, the Division reports on 17 separate 
performance indicators that were identified by the five different LHINs. Reporting on all 
the indicators requires resources and systems in place in order to meet the reporting 
requirements laid out in the L-SAA. One respondent commented that while reporting on 
the indicators is achievable, it was time-consuming: 
It's not difficult for us to achieve them [indicators], it is difficult for us when we are 
reporting to the five LHINs … the five LHINs don't even use the same template, for their 
reporting systems … we find the workload really difficult. (M2) 
Concern was also raised regarding the ability to get the work done in a timely 
manner: 
…it is not that the work doesn't get done, it doesn't get done in a timely fashion 
because of the different reporting systems that we need to meet. (M3) 
Resourcing accountability. 
Whether an increase in regulation, accountability requirements or performance 
indicators, in most instances, respondents said that meeting their accountability 
requirements was getting increasingly challenging. The proportion of funding was 
decreasing, while the expectations and requirements were increasing. Our respondents 
believed that insufficient funding was provided to implement new legislative and 
regulatory requirements. For example, although the Division attempts to be sensitive to 
the cultural needs of their residents and their families, including incorporating ongoing 
review and revision of policies, prioritizing could be affected by legal requirements. One 
respondent expressed frustration with the lack of additional funds to meet the 





… one of the residents was demanding an interpreter; this is a very expensive 
proposition to have an interpreter available constantly for an individual resident, but there 
is an act that requires that you do so. (M2) 
Quality is a major concern for the Division, especially when cuts are made to an 
already limited budget. One respondent commented on the struggles on being a municipal 
home: 
… you are limited on how far back you can cut without having an adverse effect on 
your residents, while still providing quality of care. (M7) 
As noted previously, the Toronto City Council provides funds to and oversight of the 
Division. Recognizing that the Division is one of the many responsibilities of the City 
Council, delivering care in an efficient matter is an important part of the Division's 
accountability to the City of Toronto: we [the Division] subject ourselves to higher levels 
of accountability, so there is the value for money. (M1) 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Our respondents stressed that delivering quality and safe care to the residents of the 
City of Toronto's 10 LTC homes is a top priority. Demonstrating accountability to 
funders is also required to ensure the 10 LTC homes have the resources needed to deliver 
care to this vulnerable population. The necessity of establishing 10 different 
accountability agreements with five different LHINs for its 10 LTC homes has brought to 
the foreground implementation challenges in terms of both time and human resources for 
the Division. Each LHIN is given some latitude to define performance indicators to better 
respond to the needs of the population that it serves. As a result, each home has autonomy 





(Ontario Local Health Integration Network 2012). As well, there are different funding 
opportunities for each home depending on what LHIN it resides in, including behavioural 
support units and process improvement initiatives (e.g., through the Health System 
Improvement Pre-Proposal). Although this can present difficulties in responding to the 
various requirements, the ability to respond to local health needs is seen as one of the 
benefits of regionalization. Considering the diversity between the 10 LTC homes, 
accountability agreements with the different LHINs strengthen each home's ability to 
meet the needs of its clients. 
Funding for the 10 LTC homes is transferred from the LHINs to each individual LTC 
home, and funding may vary depending on LHIN-funded priorities; however, the Toronto 
City Council allocates funds to the Division based on a global budget. This adds another 
layer of complexity that can potentially lead to resource planning challenges. For 
example, Toronto's City Council implemented a 10% funding cut in 2011, which affected 
all Divisions, including the Long-Term Care Homes and Services Division. 
Results of this study have brought to the foreground the challenges service providers 
face when implementing new legislative and regulatory requirements. This is 
increasingly challenging when negotiating accountability agreements with multiple 
organizations (in this case, LHINs) that can use funding tools to force compliance. This 
experience is not unique to Toronto's Long-Term Care Homes and Services Division 
(which deliver not only residential care but also community services and supportive 
housing services), but is also experienced by community agencies that receive public 
funding and provide services to specific populations located in different LHINs. 





implementation of measures to demonstrate quality and value for money must take into 
consideration the governance structure of service providers and the relationship between 
the funders and providers. 
As in other healthcare sectors and within the LTC sector, providers are not only 
responsible to the recipients of care (in this case, residents and their families) but also to 
other stakeholders who provide funding and are responsible for ensuring regulatory 
requirements are met to demonstrate accountability. The creation and implementation of 
accountability agreements in the City of Toronto's 10 LTC homes requires flexibility to 
accommodate and respond to the needs of the residents and their families, as well as the 
budget requirements of the City of Toronto. This does not come without its challenges for 
the Division responsible for the operation of the LTC homes. However, the Division 
recognizes these challenges and endeavours to ensure the regulatory structures are 
adhered to while maintaining balanced budgets, but more importantly ensuring quality 
and safe care for their residents. 
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Section 5 Summary  
Thesis Summary 
 The purpose of this study was to gain a broader understanding of accountability 
structures of long-term care homes that are publicly funded and publicly delivered, 
utilizing a consistent framework by Deber (2010). The framework identified four major 
approaches to accountability that can be used in both Canadian and international 
healthcare settings. These four approaches are: a) regulations b) financial incentives c) 
information directed towards patients/payers d) professionalism and stewardship. This 
framework was used to guide the analysis and presentation of results and findings. This 
chapter concludes with a summary of research and opportunities for future exploration.  
 The long-term care home sector supports almost 80,000 residents per year with 
24-hour nursing and personal care through a mix of for profit, not-for profit and 
municipally run homes. To protect this frail and vulnerable population, rigourous 
regulations and legislation must be in place. As stated previously, accountability in 
healthcare has not been well studied, and few studies have specifically examined these 
issues in the long-term care sector. The complexities of accountability are continually 
changing within this sector. There have been media reports around the need to address 
abuse and neglect in the Ontario’s LTC sector. An incident in 2013, involving a hidden 
camera, caught this abuse on tape. In 2012, a W5 investigation uncovered that more than 
10,000 seniors suffered abuse in nursing homes across Canada (Vennavally-Rao, 2013). 
These issues continue to occur and need to be addressed by continuing to highlight the 





  A partnership between the LHINs and the MOHLTC allows for a comprehensive 
compliance program to ensure that all homes are compliant with the regulations, policies, 
and standards. A complex funding formula that reflects acuity of residents is used to 
support the resources required for residents. The administration of these funds is provided 
by the LHIN and is formalized through an agreement. Based on the LHISA, the LHINs 
and LTCHs are required to enter into an agreement to formalize the accountability 
relationship between the homes and the LHINs. Beyond the administration of the L-SAA, 
the LHINs are also responsible for the performance management of homes.  
The policy instruments that support the long-term care home sector and, specifically, 
the City of Toronto long-term care homes, are regulations, financial incentives, and 
information. There is minimal influence of the professionalism/stewardship structure as 
80% of the staff providing direct patients care are unregulated healthcare professionals. 
The independent variables that are examined in relation to the policy instruments are 
policy goals, governance/ownership, and services that are being delivered. For all 
variables, the level of complexity increases for those LTC homes within the City of 
Toronto based on the presence of an additional level of accountability to the Division. 
The Division recognizes these challenges and endeavours to ensure the regulatory 
structures are adhered to while maintaining balanced budgets and ensuring safety and 
quality for their residents.  
The five LHINS to which the 10 homes are accountable based on the LHIN’s 
geographic boundaries (see Appendix A), have the opportunity to streamline their 
approach to ensure accountability with respect to process, reporting, and performance 





LTC homes requires the flexibility to respond and accommodate the needs of the 
residents and their families, while being able to meet the financial, compliance, and 
clinical requirements of the City of Toronto, MOHLTC, and LHINs. 
Recommendations 
This section speaks to where and how this research can support further research, 
policy change and impact resident care in the future. 
Resourcing. 
A key concern that was raised by all informants is the lack of resources to achieve the 
increasing accountability requirements, while continuing to emphasize the importance of 
providing value for money when receiving public funds. There was no additional funding 
provided to homes when the new regulations took effect, and changes that homes were 
required to make in order to be compliant were not funded through the MOHLTC. Other 
activities such as participation with Accreditation Canada is not funded, so homes where 
this is part of their L-SAA are required to participate and therefore must sacrifice some 
level of goods/services due to the homes’ finite resources and required to reallocate 
resources from another funded area. 
Another conflict with allocating resources is the balance between meeting the 
regulations, standards, and performance obligations and being able to provide a home-
like environment, where there is time spent with the residents and their family members 
is key. Staff and Administrators are occupied with meeting the prescribed quality 
standards and completing the associated paperwork and reporting, rather than creating 






The long-term care sector is incredibly complex. The legislative requirements and 
standards for a home for the vulnerable population are very prescriptive and, in some 
cases, require significant documentation. For the lay person, the healthcare system can be 
difficult to navigate and understand, and long-term care is no different. There are 
challenges with public perception around long-term care homes, the compliance process, 
and public reporting. There are unintended consequences of not having the background 
knowledge of the compliance program and the media influence of comparing homes with 
orders against another. LTC home selection based on minimal information for potential 
resident could be impacted resulting in lower occupancy rates, or decrease family 
satisfaction or participation.   For example, one home has an order of a staff member who 
has caused physical harm to a resident which would be compared to an order where there 
is not physical impact to a resident, rather a regulation has not been followed (i.e. a 
change in menu has not been communicated with residents.). Without further knowledge 
of these order types, the public perception is to compare the homes equally. Further 
education to the public about the compliance program will have a huge impact on the 
reputation and approaches to accountability for the long-term care homes. This is an area 
where further public engagement and knowledge transfer would support accountability 
and transparency with consumers. 
Streamline approach. 
The City of Toronto Long-Term Care Homes and Services Division finds themselves 
in a very interesting situation. While all 10 homes receiving funding from the City of 





boundaries (see Appendix A). There is opportunity to support the Division, which has 
oversight on all ten homes, by encouraging senior leadership to streamline processes. 
There are differences that occur with respect to accountability among these five LHINs. 
Informants noted that each LHIN operates very different than another LHIN, making it 
more difficult to meet the reporting requirements and the execution of the L-SAA. This 
can vary from quarterly performance requirements and reporting to the LAPS and L-SAA 
process and timelines that are uniquely defined by each LHIN. One LHIN has no 
additional LHIN-specific performance obligations above the standard performance 
indicators in the agreement, while another LHIN has eight additional indicators, some 
with monthly reporting. Each LHIN has set out different performance expectations based 
on that LHIN’s strategic priorities.  
Recommendations for Future Research 
The purpose of this research was to study approaches to accountability among the 
publicly funded and publicly delivered long-term care homes in Ontario. This study 
helped to increase the understanding of various approaches to accountability within a 
consistent framework that identified the perceived advantages and disadvantages to each 
approach. This study also identified gaps within the current accountability structure of the 
homes and the LHINs and the documents that support this relationship. There are a few 
areas of contextual comparison and further inquiry that have been identified. 
Comparisons amongst long-term care homes. 
 While a similar study was conducted through the larger research project with 
homes that were privately delivered (Berta, Laporte ,& Woodchis, 2014), a comparison 





accountability structures within the long-term care sector. Like the findings in this study, 
the research for homes from the for-profit sector also have the three dominant approaches 
to accountability which are identified as regulation, financial incentives, and the 
provision of performance information to payers and the public (Berta, Laporte, & 
Woodchis, 2014). Future research could help inform future policy, enhancement of the L-
SAA, and performance requirements and quality of care for residents. 
Comparisons cross Canada. 
All the participants in this study were employees of the City of Toronto. Other 
provincial structures or governing bodies were not represented and may have different 
challenges or benefits not identified in this study. A second step would be to extend the 
study to other provinces within Canada. Conducting a study of this nature would be time 
consuming and potentially costly.   
This study only collected qualitative data from key informants. A strategy for future 
studies may be to include a survey with open ended questions which may enable an 
examination of a wider cross-section of long-term care homes representation across 
Canada. This information would provide even more evidence to support accountability 
approaches to long-term care in Canada and perhaps leverage existing structures or 
policies to further enhance quality and value for money solutions for residents.  
Cross-continuum collaboration.  
Approaches to accountability are not just confined to the long-term care home sector 
but also has a wider implication across the healthcare continuum. This study is part of a 
larger study looking at “Approaches to Accountability” in the 11-other healthcare sub-





may be used to create best practice or guidelines for accountability that may be used 
national and global healthcare sectors.  
Key informants identified that each LHIN has their own process on how this 
agreement is executed. The experience of the LAPS and L-SAA process that the senior 
administration has is less than coordinated. There is opportunity for these LHINs to 
coordinate their approach to streamline the process for the ten homes.   
One informant expressed their concerns that even through there are performance 
obligations, when a home does not meet them; there is a lack of clarity about what the 
ramifications are. There is language in the L-SAA that supports performance 
management, including performance meetings and performance improvement process 
that may include a HSP-designed improvement plan, a review, or/and adjustment to 
funding (L-SAA, Section 7). The LHINs have discretion on how they will enact this 
section of the agreement, to what performance indicators, and when. This inconsistency 
further complicates the outcomes of not meeting accountability requirements.  
The perspectives and shared knowledge of the key informants on approaches to 
accountability were insightful and crucial for a meaningful result in answering the key 
questions surrounding accountability.  The participants came from the perspective of 
senior management as well as a cross-section of administrators responsible for long-term 
care homes.  The results of the interviews support the belief that long-term care homes 
are highly regulated.  LTCHs, and in particular those whom are publicly funded and 
publicly delivered have a very complex relationship both from a funding, compliance and 





approach with respect to interactions across the five LHINs and the City of Toronto 












Section 6 Appendices 
Appendix A: City of Toronto Long-Term Care Homes & Services Map  
 
 





Appendix B: City of Toronto Long-Term Care Homes and Services 
 
 
































Appendix E: Letter to Administrators 
Dear Administrators:  
I am a student from the University of Ontario Institute of Technology (UOIT). I have 
been lucky enough to partner with the City of Toronto, Long-Term Care Homes and 
Services, to conduct my research for my Masters of Health Science, in community health.  
I am requesting your participation in my research project in the form of a semi-
structured interview. My research project is trying to understand your views on 
accountability in the long-term care sector and the strengths and weaknesses of the 
protocols that you follow.  
What does the study involve? 
You will be asked to answer a number of questions in the form of a semi-structured 
interview over the telephone. These questions will ask you about your opinion on a 
number of areas related to accountability in long-term care, as well as some general 
demographic questions. This interview should take 30-60 minutes to complete and will 
be digitally recorded.  
All individual and facility information will be held in the strictest confidence and no 
information which enables identification of any facility or individual will be published or 
disclosed. Only summary information will be available in future reports or publications. 
Next Steps 
If you are willing to participate, I have attached the letter of consent, which I will 
need signed prior to conducting the interview. Please forward me some times & dates 
that are convenient for you by September 26
th
, 2012, if you are interested in 





I sincerely hope that you will take the time to participate and I thank you in advance 
for your willingness to partake in my research study.  
Sincerely,  


























Appendix G: Interview Guide 
Data Collection Guide – LTC 
Updated-January 20, 2011 
 
SCRIPT: 
TO BE READ AT THE BEGINNING OF THE INTERVIEW AFTER CONSENT 
FORM HAS BEEN SIGNED 
 
“CONFIDENTIALITY: 
- Your participation in this interview is completely voluntary and you may choose 
to stop it at any time. 
- No information identifying you or your organization will explicitly appear in any 
report or publication of this research unless you give consent or it is otherwise 
public knowledge.  
- Your interview transcripts and recording will be safely stored on a password 
protected computer and only research staff will have access to this information.” 
 
“I would be happy to send you a transcript of the interview, for you to correct or 
amend as needed.” 
 
“There are no right answers to any of these questions, I just want to talk with you and 





“For some questions you may know of documents where I can find the information, 







NB: types of 
services/key 





What are the main goals of your organization? Mission, Vision, Values; 
Cost, Quality, Service 
Access 
Through public reports, we are aware that you offer 
the following types of services and specialty services 
(list to interviewee).  
 
Are these accurate?  Do you provide any other 
services we have not mentioned? 
L-SAA Agreement 
Resource Dependence 
 What types of services does your organization 
contract out?  Why have you chosen to sub-contract 
for these services?  In your view, are there pros and 
cons to sub-contracting for these services and, if so, 
what are they? 
 
What types of services would your organization 





Accountability means: being answerable to another 
person, or organization for a specified outcome. You 
might be accountable to individuals internal to your 
organization, or external to it. 
 
We are going to ask you about 3 specific areas of 
accountability, in turn: financial, compliance, and 








 With respect to this aspect of accountability: 
To whom (i.e., organization, entity) is your 
organization chiefly accountable? 
 
For what is your organization accountable, i.e. what 
are the requirements? 
 
Did your organization have input into setting the 
accountability requirements? 
 
Do the accountability requirements align with or 
reflect your organization’s mission, values and goals?  
If so, can or do you use the accountability measures 
to make decisions regarding performance 
improvement initiatives in your organization?  What 
are the domains of performance in this area that your 
organization is concerned about – and how do these 
differ from what is measured through the 
accountability system that is currently in place (for 
this area of accountability)? 
 
How is accountability achieved, or demonstrated? How do they (see above 
answer) know you are 
accountable 
Is it difficult to achieve accountability/meet the 
requirements?  Why or why not? 
Who, specifically, is held accountable in your 
organization, i.e.., who reports against requirements? 
 
How clear, generally, are the roles in your 
organization around accountability? 
 
Who supplies the resources needed to ensure that 
accountability requirements are met? 
 
 What is the motivation for demonstrating 
accountability?  Why is it important to your 
organization? 
 
Are there consequences of not meeting accountability 
requirements?   
 
Is it difficult for you (your organization) to achieve 






ability to meet the requirements improved over time? 
In your view, are there any unintended consequences 




 With respect to this aspect of accountability: 
To whom (i.e., organization, entity) is your 
organization chiefly accountable? 
 
For what is your organization accountable, i.e. what 
are the requirements? 
 
Did your organization have input into setting the 
accountability requirements? 
 
Do the accountability requirements align with or 
reflect your organization’s mission, values and goals?  
If so, can or do you use the accountability measures 
to make decisions regarding performance 
improvement initiatives in your organization?  What 
are the domains of performance in this area that your 
organization is concerned about – and how do these 
differ from what is measured through the 
accountability system that is currently in place (for 
this area of accountability)? 
 
How is accountability achieved, or demonstrated?  
Is it difficult to achieve accountability/meet the 
requirements?  Why or why not? 
Who, specifically, is held accountable in your 
organization, i.e.., who reports against requirements? 
 
How clear, generally, are the roles in your 
organization around accountability? 
 
Who supplies the resources needed to ensure that 
accountability requirements are met? 
 
 What is the motivation for demonstrating 
accountability?  Why is it important to your 
organization? 
 
Are there consequences of not meeting accountability 






Is it difficult for you (your organization) to achieve 
accountability in this area?  If so, why?  Has your 
ability to meet the requirements improved over time? 
 
In your view, are there any unintended consequences 
that arise due to the need to be accountable in this 
area? 
 
Quality of Care (Clinical) 
 With respect to this aspect of accountability: 
To whom (i.e., organization, entity) is your 
organization chiefly accountable? 
 
For what is your organization accountable, i.e. what 
are the requirements? 
 
Did your organization have input into setting the 
accountability requirements? 
 
Do the accountability requirements align with or 
reflect your organization’s mission, values and goals?  
If so, can or do you use the accountability measures 
to make decisions regarding performance 
improvement initiatives in your organization?  What 
are the domains of performance in this area that your 
organization is concerned about – and how do these 
differ from what is measured through the 
accountability system that is currently in place (for 
this area of accountability)? 
 
How is accountability achieved, or demonstrated?  
Is it difficult to achieve accountability/meet the 
requirements?  Why or why not? 
Who, specifically, is held accountable in your 
organization, i.e.., who reports against requirements? 
 
How clear, generally, are the roles in your 
organization around accountability? 
 
Who supplies the resources needed to ensure that 
accountability requirements are met? 
 
What is the motivation for demonstrating 







Are there consequences of not meeting accountability 
requirements?   
 
Is it difficult for you (your organization) to achieve 
accountability in this area?  If so, why?  Has your 
ability to meet the requirements improved over time? 
 
In your view, are there any unintended consequences 
that arise due to the need to be accountable in this 
area? 
 
Other Areas In addition to the areas of accountability we have 
covered so far, are there additional entities, 
organizations or individuals to which you/your 
organization are accountable? 
An internal QI 
Committee 
 
If a member of a large 
multi-unit organization, 
like a nursing home 
chain, the may have 
additional 
accountabilities to chain 
HQ 
Summary  Does being required to meet accountability 
requirements in all of these areas (of accountability), 
introduce any tensions or necessitate any trade-offs in 




Market Entry How easy is it for an organization like yours to enter 
into the LTC sector and to provide the services, and 
specialty services, you provide? 
 
Why is it difficult/easy?  
Is it easy to move from one geographic area to 
another?  
Whether through 
expansion in the case of 
multi-unit chain, or 
relocating a home to 
another area 
Change in Services How easy is it for an organization like yours to 
change the services, and/or specialty services, you 
provide once established in the market?   
E.g.: Short stay bed, 





What makes this difficult/easy?  
Market Exit How easy is it for an organization like yours to stop 
operations and exit the market?   
 
What makes this difficult/easy?  
Measures 
 Why do you think the performance measures used in 
the LSAA were chosen? 
 
 What activities do you think are important, but are 
not being measured currently in the LSAA – if any?  
 
 Can you speculate as to why they are not being 
measured? 
 
“Thank you for taking time for this interview, if you have any questions, or think of 
any additional answers or materials that are relevant, please feel free to contact me” 
 
 
